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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL RESTRIC­
TIONS & THE FIRST AMENDMENT: To SPEAK OR NOT TO SPEAK? 
HAIG V. AGEE, 453 U.S. 280 (1981). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Constitution jealously guards the individual 
liberties that its drafters deemed essential to the operation of a dem­
ocratic society. Individual liberties such as speech, religion, press, 
and assembly, are set out expressly in the text of the first amend­
ment. 1 Other rights, such as privacy and personhood,2 have been 
included in the list of individual liberties, not through direct expres­
sion in the Constitution but by judicial interpretation.3 
The right to travel, both domestically and internationally, is one 
right not given direct expression in a constitutional amendment.4 
The tests that the United States Supreme Court will apply to deter­
mine the extent of protection afforded an individual's right to travel 
will depend upon whether one is traveling domestically or interna­
tionally. For example, the Supreme Court has long held that there is 
a constitutional right to domestic interstate travel,5 and that the right 
is virtually unqualified.6 On the other hand, the Court has yet to 
make an absolute determination of the degree of constitutional pro­
1. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohib­
iting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or of 
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances." U.S. CaNST. amend. I. 
2. The labels "privacy" and "personhood" have been employed generically by Pro­
fessor Tribe ,in his discussions of the right to education, free choice of vocation, sexual 
preference, travel, and control over one's own body. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU­
TIONAL LAW 886-1135 (1978) [hereinafter cited as L. TRIBE]. 
3. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (statute prohibiting abortion except 
when necessary to save the life of the mother struck down as an infringement on a wo­
man's right to privacy); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (persons seeking a 
divorce but who are unable to pay court fees cannot be denied access to state courts); 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (statute restricting the right of married 
persons to use contraceptive devices struck down); see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. 
YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 476-689 (1978) [hereinafter cited as J. NOWAK]. 
4. J. NOWAK, supra note 3, at 666; L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 953. 
5. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177-81 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring); 
Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 43­
44 (1868). 
6. Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. I, 4 n.6 (1978) (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 
U.S. 88, 105-06 (1971) and United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966». 
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tection to be afforded persons who travel beyond the political bound­
aries of the United States.7 
In Haig v. Agee,S the Supreme Court was confronted with the 
question of what degree of constitutional protection should be af­
forded a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer's right to 
travel throughout the world when the object of his travel was to dis­
seminate information critical of, and possibly damaging to, CIA op­
erations.9 This question was summarily addressed by the Court in 
Agee after the Court had affirmatively decided that the President, 
acting through the Secretary of State (Secretary), has the authority to 
revoke a passport on the ground that the holder's activities abroad 
are causing or are likely to cause serious damage to the national se­
curity or foreign policy of the United States.lO 
This note will focus on the constitutional questions raised by the 
revocation of Philip Agee's passport for his activities in foreign coun­
tries. In the context of the constitutional questions raised in Agee, it 
becomes clear that the constitutional right of an American citizen to 
travel abroad must inevitably compete with the broad power of the 
national government in the international arena. 1 1 The Court's hold­
ing in Agee is based on an analysis of three prior passport cases: 
Zemel v. Rusk, 12 Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 13 and Kent v. Dul­
7. In both Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) and Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 
(1958), the Court intimated that international travel is to be afforded the protection of the 
fifth amendment, while in Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964), the Court 
suggested that in certain situations, the right to international travel may be afforded first 
amendment protection. See notes 75-143 infra and accompanying text for a full discus­
sion of Zemel, Kent, and Aptheker. 
8. 453 U.S. 280 (1981). 
9. Respondent Philip Agee's disclosures of CIA operatives and agents have ap­
peared in a variety offorms. Agee's first book, Inside the Company: CIA Diary (1975), is 
a detailed account of his years as a CIA agent operating undercover in Latin America. 
In two later publications, Agee, in collaboration with others, detailed the operations of 
the CIA in Western Europe and Africa by including in his books a "Who's Who" section 
complete with names, biographies, locations, covers, and assignments. DIRTY WORK: 
THE CIA IN WESTERN EUROPE (P. Agee & L. Wolf eds. 1978); DIRTY WORK 2: THE 
CIA IN AFRICA (E. Ray, W. Schapp, K. Van Meter, & L. Wolf eds. 1979). 
Agee also held several news conferences similar to the one held in Havana, Cuba 
during July 1978, where Agee said that he and others would set up a global research 
group to scrutinize all CIA activities. N.Y. Times, July 30, 1978, at 7, col. 1. Finally, the 
editor of the British journal Time Out indicated that Philip Agee "worked with them 
preparing a series of articles identifying and publishing names of 'senior' spies at the 
American Embassy in London." N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1976, at 3, col. 1. 
10. 453 U.S. at 306. 
11. J. NOWAK, supra note 3, at 666. 
12. 381 U.S. I (1965). 
13. 378 U.S. 500 (1964). 
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les,14 each of which involved the overlapping rights of speech or as­
sociation and travel. 
The Court attempted to minimize the impact ofAgee by rooting 
its decision in the administrative law issue concerning the extent to 
which power may be delegated by Congress to the Secretary. IS 
Agee's passport, however, was revoked because of the threat to na­
tional security posed by his speech and publications: two areas tra­
ditionally afforded protection by the first amendment. 16 The 
question to be considered is whether the Court erred in failing to 
address all first amendment aspects of Agee. 
This note also will address the question of whether, at mini­
mum, the Court should have explored the possibility of affording the 
injured individual greater constitutional protection in situations in 
which the right to free speech has been violated under the pretext of 
regulating the right to travel abroad. The Agee Court's failure to 
give adequate consideration to these issues has granted to the Secre­
tary virtually unlimited authority to revoke or deny passports. I? The 
exercise of such authority not only interferes with the right to travel, 
but also infringes upon the first amendment rights of speech, press, 
and association. 
II. AGEE 
A Facts and Procedural History 
The facts of Agee were not in dispute. ls Between 1957 and 
1968, Agee held a position of trust with the CIAI9 Agee's position 
required him to receive training in covert intelligence gathering and 
in methods used to protect identities of intelligence operatives and 
sources working for the United States.20 While serving in under­
cover assignments abroad, Agee developed highly confidential rela­
tionships with persons responsible for supplying the CIA with 
intelligence information on a continual basis; many of these opera­
tives still are functioning as sources for the CIA21 
The twelve years Agee spent in the employ of the CIA had a 
14. 357 U.S. 116 (1958). 
15. 453 U.S. at 289-306. 
16. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 576-734. 
17. See text accompanying notes 144-92 infra. 
18. 453 U.S. at 287 & n.ll. 
19. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 
Brief for Petitioner]. 
20. 453 U.S. at 283. 
21. Id. Throughout Agee's clandestine career in Latin America he was employed 
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profound effect on his attitudes toward the role of the United States 
and the CIA in the Third World. Agee initially favored the CIA's 
policies and methods in Latin America because the articulated pur­
pose was to enable reform minded governments to gain a foothold. 22 
But Agee gradually came to the conclusion that the CIA's policies 
perpetuated the division between the rich and the poor, in some in­
stances to the distinct advantage of United States businesses.23 
Agee's disillusionment with the policies of the CIA continued until 
finally, on October 3, 1974, he conducted the first of a series of press 
conferences designed to inform the world of his campaign to disrupt 
and destroy the CIA. 24 At the last of these conferences orchestrated 
by the American Institute for Free Labor Development, an arm of the AFL-CIO. N.Y. 
Times, July 9, 1974, at 27, col. l. 
As a prerequisite to employment with the CIA, Agee signed a contract which re­
quired that he not discuss or publish, without prior approval, "any information or mate­
rial relating to the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally, either during 
or after the term of [his) employment. ..." Brief for Petitioner at 3, supra note 19. 
Agee's employment contract with the CIA was identical to the contract which the Court 
examined in Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980). In Snepp, the question was the 
validity of a constructive trust imposed on the profits of Snepp's book which told of his 
experiences while in the employ of the CIA. See also Agee v. CIA, 500 F. Supp. 506 
(D.D.C. 1980). 
Although the civil action against Agee for disseminating CIA information produced 
a decision which enjoined any future uncensored writing, id. at 509, Agee was subse­
quently informed by the Justice Department that criminal prosecution under the Espio­
nage Act, 18 U.S.c. §§ 792-799 (1976), would not be forthcoming because no ground for 
prosecution could be found. N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1977, at 7, col. 1. 
22. N.Y. Times, July 12, 1977, at 7, col. 1. 
23. Id. Agee's disillusionment was fostered by the belief that the CIA's main role 
was to "keep the lid" on fledgling counter-insurgency movements in Latin America and 
on the more prominent counter-insurgency movements in Vietnam. Agee's analysis of 
the CIA's role led him to believe that the liberal reform theories espoused by the CIA 
were merely rhetoric; a disguise for "American imperialism." Id. For a more detailed 
account of Agee's ideological transformation, see P. AGEE, INSIDE THE COMPANY: CIA 
DIARY (1975). 
24. The text of the first press release from London read: 
Today, I announced a new campaign to fight the United States CIA wher­
ever it is operating. This campaign will have two main functions: First, to ex­
pose CIA officers and agents and to take the measures necessary to drive them 
out of the countries where they are operating; secondly, to seek within the 
United States to have the CIA abolished. 
This effort to identify CIA people in foreign countries has been going on 
for some time .... (Today's) list was compiled by a small group of Mexican 
comrades whom I trained to follow the comings and goings of CIA people 
before I left Mexico City. 
Similar lists of CIA people in other countries are already being compiled 
and will be announced when appropriate. We invite participation in this cam­
paign from all those who strive for social justice and national dignity. 
Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d 80, 88-89 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (MacKinnOil, J., dissenting), rev'd 
sub nom. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981). 
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by Agee,25 Louis Wolf, one of Agee's collaborators, named fifteen 
individuals as CIA agents operating in Jamaica.26 One week after 
Wolfs publicized announcement, the homes of two named individu­
als were attacked.27 
To carry out his program of .disruption, it was necessary for 
Agee to travel to several countries. He first singled out a target coun­
try and, upon arrival, consulted with sources and contacts known to 
him from his prior service in the CIA.28 Thereafter, Agee began a 
recruitment and training program to acquaint his sympathizers with 
CIA techniques and clandestine operations. Agee's avowed purpose 
for using these techniques was to expose the "cover" of CIA employ­
ees and sources.29 
In December 1979, pursuant to sections 51.70(b)(4) and 51.7l(a) 
to title 22 of the Code of Federal Regulations,30 the Secretary re­
voked Agee's passport by delivering an explanatory notice31 to Agee 
in West Germany.32 Agee waived his right to a hearing33 and, in­
25. Brief for Petitioner at 125a, supra note 19. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 1 26a-27a. 
28. 453 U.S. at 284. 
29. Id. CIA Deputy Director for Operations, John N. McMahon, indicated that 
"Mr. Agee. . . is perceived abroad as a highly credible source. Thus Mr. Agee's efforts 
to use this privileged information. . . disrupted the activities of the CIA. [I)f he contin­
ues these efforts it will certainly place the lives and safety of American officials in jeop­
ardy." Brief for Petitioner at 112a, supra note 19. 
30. The regulations state that: "A passport may be refused in any case in which 
. . . the Secretary determines that the national's activities abroad are causing or are 
likely to cause serious damage to the national security or foreign policy of the United 
States." 22 C.F.R. § 51.70(b)(4) (1981). In addition, "A passport may be revoked, re­
stricted, or limited where . . . the national would not be entitled to issuance of a new 
passport under § 51.70." 22 C.F.R. § 51.7 I (a) (1981). 
31. The notice read in part: 
The Department of State has requested the Consulate to inform you that 
the Department has revoked Passport No. Z3007741 issued to you on March 30, 
1978 under the provisions of Section 51.71(a) of Title 22, Code of Federal Reg­
ulations. 
The Department's action is predicated upon a determination made by the 
Secretary under the provisions of Section 51.70(b)( 4) that your activities abroad 
are causing or are likely to cause serious damage to the national security or the 
foreign policy of the United States .... Your stated intention to continue such 
activities threatens additional damage of the same kind. 
You are advised of your right to a hearing under Sections 51.80 through 
5l.l05 of the Regulations. 
Petitioner's Brief at 120a, supra note 19. 
32. 453 U.S. at 286. Agee took up residence in West Germany after his deporta­
tion from Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands. See DIRTY WORK: THE CIA IN 
WESTERN EUROPE, supra note 9, at 286-300. 
33. 453 U.S. at 287. The State Department was prepared to hold an administrative 
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stead, filed suit against the Secretary in the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia.34 Agee alleged, inter alia, that 
section 51.70(b)(4) was impermissibly overbroad and that the revo­
cation of his passport violated both his fifth amendment liberty inter­
est in the right to travel abroad and his first amendment right to 
criticize the govemment.35 Agee moved for summary judgment on 
the question of the Secretary's authority to promulgate the regula­
tions and on the constitutional claims.36 Solely for the purposes of 
the motion, Agee conceded the Government's factual averments37 
and the claim that his activities were causing or were likely to cause 
damage to the national security or foreign policy of the United 
States.38 After an analysis of Kent, Zemel, and the Passport Act of 
1926,39 Judge Gesell determined that the Passport Act does not grant 
the Secretary unbridled discretion to revoke or deny passports.40 In 
addition, Judge Gesell found that Congress had neither expressly 
nor impliedly authorized the Secretary to promulgate the challenged 
regulation.41 The Court granted Agee's motion for summary judg­
ment and, in doing so, found it unnecessary to consider the constitu­
tional questions.42 
The district court's decision was affirmed in Agee v. Muskie .43 
hearing in West Germany on five days notice in accordance with 22 C.F.R. §§ 51.80­
51.89 (1981). 453 U.S. at 287 & n.9. 
34. 453 U.S. at 287. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. 22 U.S.C. § 21 I (a) (1976). The Passport Act states in relevant part: "The Sec­
retary of State may grant and issue passports, and cause passports to be granted, issued, 
and verified .... and no other person shall grant, issue, or verify such passports." Id. 
40. Agee v. Vance, 483 F. Supp. 729, 730 (D.D.C.), ajf'd sub nom. Agee v. Muskie, 
629 F.2d 80 (D.C. Cir. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981). 
41. Id. at 732. 
42. Id. Generally, the federal courts will not pass on a constitutional question if a 
construction may be given to a regulation or statute by which the constitutional issue 
may be avoided. United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23,27 (1980); Driscoll v. Edison Light 
& Power Co., 307 U.S. 104, 115 (1939); Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Uti!. Corp., 300 
U.S. 55, 75-76 (1937). 
43. 629 F.2d 80 (D.C. Cir. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981). 
For a discussion ofAgee v. Muskie, see Comment, The CIA Responds to its Black Sheep: 
Censorship and Passport Revocation--The Cases ofPhilip Agee, 13 CONN. L. REV. 317 
(1981); Case Comment, Administrative Law-Passports May Not Be Revoked.for National 
Security and Foreign Policy Reasons Without Congressional Authorization--Agee v. Mus­
kie, 629 F.2d 80 (D.C. Cir. 1980), 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 508 (1981); Recent Develop­
ments, Constitutional Law: Authority ofSecretary ofState to Revoke Passports-Agee v. 
Muskie, 629 F.2d 80 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. granted sub nom. Muskie v. Agee, 49 
U.S.L.W. 3211 (Oct. 7, 1980),22 HARV. INT'L L.l. 187 (1981). 
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Again finding it unnecessary to reach the constitutional question,44 
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held 
that section S1.70(b)(4) was promulgated by the Secretary and en­
forced against Agee without congressional authorization.45 
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision46 and 
held that the policy announced in the challenged regulation was 
"sufficiently substantial and consistent" with past administrative 
practice to conclude that Congress tacitly approved it.47 As a result, 
the Court concluded that the constitutional claims were without 
merit.48 
B. Rationale 
Prior to determining the validity of Agee's constitutional claims, 
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, focused on the Secre­
tary's authority to promulgate sections S1.70(b)(4) and S1.71(a)49 in 
light of the Passport Act. 50 The Passport Act does not expressly 
grant the Secretary the authority to deny or revoke passports.51 
Therefore, in order to find the Secretary's regulation valid, the Court 
had to find implied congressional approval. To do so in the face of 
congressional silence, it was necessary to find an "administrative 
practice sufficiently substantial and consistent to warrant the conclu­
sion that Congress had [acquiesced to the practice and] implicitly 
approved it."52 In Agee, the Court reformulated the test and found 
44. 629 F.2d at 87 n.9. 
45. Id. at 87. The court did not find it necessary to uphold the regulation on the 
ground that some people may consider Agee's conduct to border on treason. The court 
said, "We are bound by the law as we find it." Id. 
The Passport Act of 1926 does not grant the Secretary of State the express authority 
to promulgate regulations which would enable him to revoke passports. See note 39 
supra. Absent express authority, the court must find a "sufficiently substantial and con­
sistent administrative practice" to show implied congressional approval. See notes 52-53 
infra and accompanying text. In Agee v. Muskie, the court found neither. 629 F.2d at 87. 
46. 453 U.S. 280 (1981). Chief Justice Burger stayed the judgment of the court of 
appeals on July 22, 1980. Agee moved to vacate the stay, but, upon the Court's grant of 
certiorari, Agee's motion was denied. Muskie v. Agee, 449 U.S. 818, affd sub nom Haig 
v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981). 
47. 453 U.S. at 306. 
48. !d. 
49. See note 30 supra. 
50. 453 U.S. at 289-306. 
51. !d. at 290. See note 39 supra. 
52. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. I, 12 (1965). The sufficiently substantial and consis­
tent administrative practice test was first enunciated in Zemel. This author has found no 
other case law which defines these terms, nor has the Burger Court had occasion to pass 
on its validity. See Case Comment, supra note 43, at 514. 
456 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW (Vol. 4:449 
that the policy announced in the challenged regulation had im­
pliedly been approved by Congress. 53 
The "sufficiently substantial and consistent" administrative 
practice test, first articulated in Zemel, was given content by an ex­
amination of prior passport cases and legislative history. 54 Although 
the court of appeals and the Supreme Court reviewed the same cases 
and legislative history to determine whether the Passport Act im­
pliedly granted the Secretary authority to promulgate the challenged 
regulation, the courts came to different conclusions. 55 This divergent 
reading of the passport cases evidently was based on other consider­
ations not articulated in either opinion. The Supreme Court major­
ity in Agee held that the Secretary's passport regulations were 
impliedly consented to by Congress,56 thus, it apparently did not find 
troublesome the task of gleaning intention from congressional si­
53. 453 U.S. at 306. In his dissent, Justice Brennan points out that the sufficiently 
substantial and consistent test as set out in Zemel requires that it relate to an administra­
tive practice and not an administrative policy or construction as was determined by the 
. majority. Id. at 314 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Apparently this means that the Govern­
ment's burden is lighter if it has to demonstrate that a policy or construction of a statute 
or regulation has been consistently adhered to as opposed to the necessity of demonstrat­
ing that the policy was given content by showing a consistent practice. 
Justice Brennan goes on to state that "Kent unequivocally states that mere construc­
tion by the Executive-no matter how longstanding and consistent-is not sufficient." 
Id. (emphasis in original). The test requires more than acquired discretion on the part of 
the Secretary; it requires exercise of the discretion. Id. at 315. 
The majority contends that "it would be anomalous to fault the Government be­
cause there were so few occasions to exercise the announced policy and practice . . . it 
suffices that the Executive has 'openly asserted' the power at issue." Id. at 303. 
Justice Brennan responded by stating that: 
. (N)o one is 'faulting' the Government because there are only a few occasions 
when it has seen fit to deny or revoke passports for foreign policy or national 
security reasons, ... (but] the Executive's authority to revoke passports touches 
an area fraught with important Constitutional rights, and that the Court should 
therefore 'construe narrowly all delegated powers that curtail or dilute them.' 
Id. at 318 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. at 129). See Ex 
parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 301-02 (1944). 
54. 453 U.S. at 291-306. 
55. Compare 453 U.S. 280 (1981) with 629 F.2d 80 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
56. 453 U.S. at 306. In another passport case the Secretary of State sought to deny 
passports to five United States citizens who desired to go on fact-finding trips through 
China, Cuba, North Korea, North Vietnam, and Syria. The court, in attempting to de­
termine the extent of the Secretary's authority in light of congressional silence in the 
Passport Act said that "(g]leaning intention from Congressional silence is under the best 
of circumstances an elusive task. . . the soft support of silence from Congress does not 
permit an inference that it has authorized executive curtailment of the constitutionally 
protected 'liberty' of travel to non-restricted areas ... ." Lynd v. Rusk, 389 F.2d 940, 
946-47 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
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lence.57 Once the Court determined that it was within the Secre­
tary's authority to apply his regulation to Agee, the Court then was 
obliged to respond to Agee's allegations that he was denied his con­
stitutional rights. 58 
The Court based its constitutional holding on the premise that 
Agee's conduct was damaging to the national security and foreign 
policy of the United States.59 While it is true that Agee's conduct 
included traveling from country to country and recruiting foreign 
personnel for anti-CIA operations, the Court also chose to focus on 
Agee's disclosures at press conferences and in print.60 Speaking at a 
press conference or writing an article or book may well be consid­
ered conduct, but this conduct is inextricably tied to speech and press 
rights that fall under the first amendment.61 The Court, however, 
refused to consider this argument and, instead, held that the revoca­
tion of Agee's passport was clearly an "inhibition of [his] 'action' 
rather than of [his] speech."62 This proposition appears inconsistent 
with the Court's finding that the revocation of Agee's passport rested 
in part on the content of his disclosures of intelligence operations 
and undercover personne1.63 By raising this point, the Court under­
cut its determination that the Secretary attempted solely to restrict 
conduct. The Court apparently raised the question of Agee's speech 
in dicta to analogize the facts of Agee to a hypothetical situation 
presented in Near v. Minnesota.64 In Near, the Court determined 
that the Government could prohibit publication of the sailing dates 
of transport ships and the location of American troops65 because the 
publication could be damaging to national security.66 
57. In trying to mold the historical evidence to show congressional acquiescence in 
the form of congressional silence, the Supreme Court has impliedly set out a principle 
which states that "only the clearest of such evidence will permit this Court to consider 
Congressional silence to be a substitute for explicit and affirmative legislative action in 
limiting the free exercise of important [constitutional) rights." Woodward v. Rogers, 344 
F. Supp. 974, 985 (D.D.C. 1972), qlf'd, 486 F.2d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See, e.g., Greene 
v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Exparte Endo, 323 
U.S. 283 (1944). 
58. See note 42 supra and accompanying text. 
59. 453 U.S. at 304-05. 
60. Id. at 308. 
61. See generally J. NOWAK, supra note 3, at 688-817. 
62. 453 U.S. at 309 (quoting Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. at 16). See notes 183-92 infra 
and accompanying text. 
63. 453 U.S. at 308. 
64. 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
65. Id. at 716 (noting exceptions to the principle that prohibits prior restraint). 
66. There is a serious question, however, as to whether the prior restraint exception 
noted in Near is applicable to Agee. The prior restraint discussion in Near was part of a 
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Having disposed of the need for a first amendment analysis that 
would have required support from Aptheker v. Secretary ofState,67 
the Court proceeded to find that the right of international travel, 
when not tied to other constitutional rights, is no more than a "lib­
erty" interest which may be regulated within the bounds of fifth 
amendment due process.68 
In applying the fifth amendment standard of review, the Court 
found that restricting Agee's travel by revoking his passport was the 
only avenue open to the government to limit his activities.69 With­
out other alternatives, this method was rationally related to the 
"[p]rotection of the foreign policy of the United States ... a gov­
larger discussion by the Court as to whether a publication known as "The Saturday 
Press" could continue to print articles charging that a Jewish gangster was in control of 
various organized crime activities in Minnesota. Id. at 704. Chief Justice Hughes em­
ployed the "troop movement" hypothetical to illustrate that there are extreme situations 
in which prior restraint is constitutionally permissible. He concluded that the exception 
was not applicable in Near. Id. at 716. 
In his dissent in Agee, Justice Brennan pointed out that Near is only applicable 
when the activity "must inevitably, directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of an 
event kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea." 453 U.S. at 320, n.lO 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 
726-27 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring». One might also question whether Agee's publi­
cations and press conferences during a time when the United States was not involved in a 
war is analogous to the hypothetical situation in Near, since the publication of troop 
movements during a time of war would have an extreme and immediate impact. 
Justice Brennan also argued that Agee's concessions to the Government's factual 
averments were merely for the purpose of challenging the facial validity of the Secre­
tary's regulation and not for establishing their application to this case. It is only when 
the facts are established that the Court can determine whether they fall within the class of 
cases which follow the Near exception. Id. 
Furthermore, in New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), the 
Court noted that the extremely narrow class of cases where the first amendment ban on 
prior restraint may be overridden can arise only when the nation "is at war." Id. at 726 
(Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919». 
When Agee's passport was revoked the United States was not officially "at war" although 
the Iranian hostage crisis was well under way. 
67. 378 U.S. 500 (1964). Aptheker was a travel restriction case in which the Court 
employed a first amendment analysis because of the infringement on associational rights 
created by the travel restriction. See text accompanying notes 97-126 infra. 
68. 453 U.S. at 307. See Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 175-76 (1978); 
Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1,4 n.6 (1978); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 643 n.l, 
666 n.23 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 666 n.23 (Harlan, J., dissenting); United 
States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475, 481 (1967); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. I, 14 (1965); Aptheker 
v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125-27 
(1958). But if. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 912 & n.55 (9th Cir. 1973) (stating 
that the "freedom to travel at home and abroad without unreasonable governmental re­
striction is a fundamental constitutional right of every American citizen" although the 
"constitutional source of the right is not yet settled"). 
69. 453 U.S. at 308. 
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emmental interest of great importance."7o 
The crux of the constitutional problem, however, is brought 
forth in Justice Brennan's dissent.71 While conceding that Agee is 
hardly a model representative of our nation, Justice Brennan 
stressed that the majority's decision applied not only to Agee, whose 
activities could be perceived as harmful to national security, but also 
to other citizens who may disagree with national foreign policy and 
express their views.72 Justice Brennan did not undertake a full anal­
ysis of the constitutional problem because he would have upheld the 
decision of the lower courts on the administrative issue.73 Wishing, 
however, to have his position fully understood, he said, "[t]he Court 
seems to misunderstand the prior precedents of this Court, for Agee's 
speech is undoubtedly protected by the Constitution."74 It is open to 
speculation whether the outcome of this case would have been differ­
ent had the Court engaged in a first amendment analysis. The ques­
tion to be asked here is whether the Court should have addressed 
Agee's situation from a first amendment rather than a fifth amend­
ment perspective. 
70. Id. at 307. The Court also indicated the need to maintain confidentiality of 
diplomatic, consular, and other officials who provide foreign policy and national security 
information to the President. Id. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 
304,320 (1936); accord, Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 
103, III (1948); THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 432, 434-35 (J. Jay) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
71. 453 U.S. at 310 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
72. Id. at 319. At oral argument, Justice Brennan elicited a response from Solicitor 
General McCree which led Justice Brennan to conclude that the "reach of the Secretary's 
discretion is potentially staggering." Id. at 319 n.9. Justice Brennan asked whether the 
Secretary could refuse to issue a passport to an American citizen who wished to travel to 
El Salvador if it were determined that the trip's sole purpose was to denounce the United 
States policy in support of the ruling junta. McCree responded in the affirmative, adding 
that the "freedom of speech that we enjoy domestically may be different from that that 
we can exercise in this [international] context." Id. 
In addition, the Secretary's regulatory power can be triggered upon fear of possible 
harm to national security or foreign policy. Obviously, there is a significant difference 
between the concepts with "foreign policy" being much broader in scope. In general, 
"national security" may be defined as the ability of a nation to protect its internal values 
from external threats. It is generally considered to be a more specialized subarea of a 
country's overall foreign policy. See generally II INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 40-45 (D. Sills ed. reprint 1972). On the other hand, "foreign 
policy" is a generic term encompassing the institutional and individual behavior of a 
government in its political, economic, social, and military relations with other govern­
ments. See generally 5 id. at 530-35. See also 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN FOREIGN 
POLICY 623-34 (A. DeConde ed. 1978) for a series of essays covering a variety of specific 
topics under the foreign policy heading including "national security." 
73. 453 U.S. at 320 n.1O (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
74. Id. While Justice Brennan's unequivocal statement may be open to argument, 
it does raise the valid point that there is an important first amendment problem in this 
case that should have been discussed in full by the majority. 
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III. THE PASSPORT RESTRICTION CASES 
A. Travel-A F!fth Amendment Right? 
Kent, Aptheker, and Zemef75 represent the foundation of what 
has become a mountain of litigation in the lower courts 76 concerning 
an American citizen's ability to travel outside the political bounda­
ries of the United States. Prior to Kent, the Supreme Court had not 
confronted the question of what limits should be imposed on the use 
of passports to protect the interests of the United States from the 
activities of citizens traveling abroad. 
In Kent v. Du/les,77 the Court was confronted with a situation 
involving two American citizens, Rockwell Kent and Dr. Walter 
Briehl,78 both alleged members of the Communist Party. Shortlyaf­
ter Kent applied for a passport to attend a conference in Helsinki, 
Finland, he was informed that the issuance of a passport to him was 
precluded by section 51.135 to title 22 of the Code of Federal Regu­
lations.79 The Secretary charged that Kent was a Communist with a 
75. See notes 12-14 supra. In each of these cases, the fifth amendment is discussed 
either in dicta or as a basis for the decision. 
76. Since the focus here is restricted to the constitutional issues raised by Agee, it is 
beyond the scope of this note to engage in a full discussion of all the lower court right to 
travel cases, although where relevant, selected cases will be discussed. See generally Ber­
rigan v. Sigler, 499 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Lynd v. Rusk, 389 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 
1967); Worthy v. United States, 328 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1964); Worthy v. Herter, 270 F.2d 
905 (D.C. Cir.), cerl. denied, 361 U.S. 918 (1959); Reyes v. United States, 258 F.2d 774 
(9th Cir. 1958); Shachtman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Woodward v. Rog­
ers, 344 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1972); MacEwan v. Rusk, 228 F. Supp. 306 (E.D. Pa. 
1964), qffd, 344 F.2d 963 (3d Cir. 1965); United States v. Eramdjian, 155 F. Supp. 914 
(S.D. Cal. 1957); Boudin v. Dulles, 136 F. Supp. 218 (D.D.C. 1955); Bauer v. Acheson, 
106 F. Supp. 445 (D. D.C. 1952). 
77. 357 U.S. 116 (1958). . 
78. The facts relating to Briehl are identical to those relating to Kent. Briehl, a 
psychiatrist, applied for a passport, but like Kent, was denied when he refused to supply 
an affidavit pertaining to his alleged membership in the Communist Party. Kent v. Dul­
les, 357 U.S. 116, 120-21 (1958). The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari and 
heard both cases together. Kent v. Dulles, 355 U.S. 881 (1957) (grant of certiorari). 
79. 357 U.S. at 117. The Kenl Court set out the relevant portions of 22 C.F.R. 
§ 51.135 which states: 
In order to promote the national interest by assuring that persons who sup­
port the world Communist movement of which the Communist Party is an inte­
gral unit may not, through use of United States passports, further the purposes 
of that movement, no passport, except one limited for direct and immediate 
return to the United States, shall be issued to: 
(a) Persons who are members of the Communist Party or who have re­
cently terminated such membership under such circumstances as to warrant the 
conclusion-not otherwise rebutted by the evidence-that they continue to act 
in furtherance of the interests and under the discipline of the Communist Party; 
(b) Persons, regardless of the formal state of their affiliation with the 
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consistent and prolonged adherence to the Communist Party line. In 
accordance with the regulation, Kent was required to submit an affi­
davit stating whether he was a Communist.80 
Kent refused to submit the affidavit on the ground that the re­
quirement was unconstitutional.8 1 Upon receiving Kent's response, 
the State Department determined that it would take no further ac­
tion on Kent's passport application until the required affidavit was 
submitted.82 
The Court invalidated the Secretary's action, analogizing it to 
past administrative practice cases relating to travel restrictions. The 
review of past administrative practice revealed that unless the pass­
port applicant participated in illegal conduct or was either not a citi­
zen of, or not loyal to the United States, there could be no 
restriction.83 Absent an express delegation of power to the Secretary 
from Congress authorizing passport denials or revocations,84 the 
Court did not wish to impute this motive to Congress without a long­
standing administrative practice. The Court felt that to do so would 
give the Secretary unbridled discretion over travel regulation, thus 
allowing him to deny, grant, or revoke passports for any substantive 
reason he may choose.85 
Having found that the Secretary had gone beyond his authority 
Communist Party, who engage in activities which support the Communist 
movement under such circumstances as to warrant the conclusion-not other­
wise rebutted by the evidence-that they have engaged in such activities as a 
result of direction, domination, or control exercised over them by the Commu­
nist movement; 
(c) Persons, regardless of the formal state of their affiliation with the 
Communist Party, as to whom there is reason to believe, on the balance of all 
the evidence, that they are going abroad to engage in activities which will ad­
vance the Communist movement for the purpose, knowingly and wilfully of 
advancing that movement. 
357 U.S. at 117-18 n.!. See also Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d at 84 n.3 (regulation was 
struck down by Supreme Court in Kent). 
80. 357 U.S. at 118-19. 
8!. Id. Like Kent, Briehl also refused to submit an affidavit charging: (I) that his 
political affiliation was irrelevant to his right to a passport; (2) that "every American 
citizen has the right to travel regardless of politics"; and (3) that the burden was on the 
State Department to prove illegal activities by Briehl. Id. at 120. 
82. Id. at 119. 
83. Id. at 127. The Court found that past administrative practice relating to Com­
munists was scattered and not consistently of one pattern. Id. at 128. It must be borne in 
mind that Philip Agee's citizenship was not disputed, nor were there grounds to charge 
him with criminal activity. See text accompanying notes 28-29 supra. 
84. See note 39 supra. 
85. 357 U.S. at 128. In effect this is what Justice Brennan believed was the result of 
the Court's decision in Agee. 453 U.S. at 319 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
462 	 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REViEW [Vol. 4:449 
in denying passports to Kent and Briehl, the Court was precluded 
from considering the constitutional questions lying beneath the sur­
face. This did not prevent Justice Douglas from setting out in dicta 
the relationship between the right to travel abroad and specific pro­
visions of the Constitution.86 Justice Douglas expressly connected 
the right to travel abroad to the liberty interest protected by the due 
process clause of the fifth amendment. 87 Thus, any restriction on the 
right to travel abroad is subject to a test of "reasonableness" in light 
of the important state interest the restriction is designed to protect. 
Other language in Justice Douglas' opinion pointed to the possi­
bility of placing the right to travel abroad at the periphery of the first 
amendment when the situation so requires. Justice Douglas noted 
that freedom of movement has larger social values.88 In Kent, the 
Court was confronted with more than a travel restriction case be­
cause the parties' beliefs and associations were involved. Freedom 
of movement was restricted solely because Kent and Briehl refused 
to allow inquiries into their beliefs and associations.89 Justice Doug­
las' allusion to possible first amendment violations when travel 
abroad is restricted was more clearly articulated and developed in 
later opinions,90 but the groundwork for a first amendment analysis 
was established in Kent. 
B. 	 Travef.-A First Amendment Right? 
By deciding in favor of Kent and Briehl on the administrative 
issue, the Court in Kent was able to avoid the difficult constitutional 
issues that finally surfaced inAptheker.91 InAptheker, the Court was 
confronted with a challenge to the constitutionality of section 6 of 
the Subversive Activities Control Act.92 Appellants Elizabeth Gur­
86. 	 357 u.s. at 125-26 (dicta). 
87. 	 Id. 
88. 	 Id. at 126. 
89. 	 Id. at 130. 
90. 	 See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1,23-26 (1965) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Aptheker 
v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 520-21 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
91. 	 378 U.S. 500, 505-14 (1964). 
92. 	 50 U.S.c. § 785 (1976). The Act states in relevant part: 
(a) 	 When a Communist organization ... is registered, or there is in effect a 
final order of the Board requiring such organization to register, it shall be 
unlawful for any member of such organization, with knowledge or notice 
that such organization is so registered or that such order has become 
final­
(I) 	 to make application for a passport or the renewal of a passport, 
to be issued or renewed by or under the authority of the United 
States; or 
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ley Flynn and Herbert Eugene Aptheker, were native citizens of the 
United States holding valid United States passports.93 On January 
22, 1962, the Secretary revoked appellants' passports based solely on 
the findings of the Board of Passport Appeals.94 
Appellants asked that the statute be declared unconstitutional 
because, inter alia, it infringed on their constitutional liberty to travel 
abroad in violation of the fifth amendment, and it abridged their 
freedom of speech, press, and assembly in violation of the first 
amendment.95 
Justice Goldberg expressly affirmed the dicta from Kent which 
unequivocally stated that the right to travel abroad is an important 
aspect of a citizen's liberty and therefore is guaranteed by the fifth 
amendment.96 To decide whether the restrictions on travel set out in 
section 6 were too broad, the Court enunciated a four-part inquiry. 
First, the Court must determine whether the person knows or be­
lieves that the organization to which he belongs is a "Communist 
action" or "Communist front" organization.97 Second, the level of 
the member's commitment to the organization must be scrutinized. 
If the member lacks a firm commitment, there is no guarantee that 
his travels will produce the activity Congress sought to contro1.98 
Third, there must be an inquiry into the purpose of the individual's 
(2) to use or attempt to use any such passport. 
Id. 
93. 378 U.S. at 502. 
94. Id. at 503. The Board of Passport Appeals found that " 'at all material times 
[appellants were members) of the Communist Party of the United States with knowledge 
or notice that such organization had been required to register as a Communist organiza­
tion under the Subversive Activities Control Act''' and therefore were in violation of 
section 6 of the Act. Id. (quoting the final order of the Board of Passport Appeals). 
95. Id. at 503-04. 
96. Id. at 505. 
97. Id. at 509-10. For support, the Court cited Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 
(1952), a case in which the state attempted to bar disloyal persons from its employ solely 
on the basis of organizational membership without regard to their knowledge concerning 
the organization to which they belonged. The Wieman Court concluded that to inhibit 
freedom of movement is to stifle the flow of democratic expression at its source. The 
Court reasoned that indiscriminate classification of innocent activity must fall as an arbi­
trary assertion of power. Id. at 191. 
98. 378 U.S. at 510. In Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.s. 232 (1957), 
Justice Black said, "[a)ssuming that some members of the Communist Party ... had 
illegal aims and engaged in illegal activities, it cannot automatically be inferred that all 
members shared their evil purposes or participated in their illegal conduct." Id. at 246. 
One of the objections raised in Aplheker to section 6 of the Subversive Activities 
Control Act is that it establishes an irrebuttable presumption that one who belongs to a 
given organization will at all times adhere to and advance that organization's philosophy. 
378 U.S. at 511. 
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travel plans. Under section 6, not only is it a crime for a Communist 
organization member to apply for a passport so that he may partici­
pate in subversive activities, but it is also a crime for a Communist 
organization member to apply for a passport so that he may visit a 
sick relative, receive medical treatment, or travel abroad for any in­
nocent purpose.99 Finally, the Court must inquire into the congres­
sional decisionmaking process to determine whether Congress chose 
the least drastic means to achieve the objective of protecting national 
security. 100 
In responding to the Government's contention that one could 
regain his passport by giving up his association with the organization 
in question, Justice Goldberg announced that the first amendment 
. freedom of association101 was implicated and held that section 6 was 
unconstitutional on its face.102 In doing so, Justice Goldberg en­
gaged in a first amendment "overbreadth" analysis, which seeks to 
insure that when the government attempts to control or prevent ac­
tivities that constitutionally may be regulated, the regulation does 
not sweep unnecessarily broadly, thereby invading the area of pro­
tected freedoms. 103 
The Court in Aplheker chose to apply the overbreadth analysis 
in an international travel case. Until this point, international travel 
cases had required only a fifth amendment due process analysis, 
thus, as a result ofAplheker, there was reason to believe that in con­
sidering future international travel cases in which a regulation im­
pinged on first amendment rights the Court would apply a strict first 
amendment standard. One commentator concluded that in situa­
tions in which a traveler's first amendment right is restricted, the 
Court automatically should afford the traveler a higher degree of 
protection under the first amendment. 104 
Justice Goldberg's rationale in Aplheker, that freedom to travel 
is closely related to freedom of speech and association,105 is based on 
his view that a personal, rather than a property right is infringed 
upon by the statute. Justice Goldberg cited both NAACP v. BUI­
99. 378U.S.at511. 
100. Id. at 512-13. 
101. See L. TRIBE, supra note 2 at 700-10. 
102. 378 U.S. at 508. 
103. /d. (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307, (1964»; accord, Shelton 
v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). 
104. L. Turner, The Right to Travel and the Problem of Unenumerated Constitu­
tional Rights 309 (1972) (unpublished dissertation on file at the University of California, 
Los Angeles library). 
lOs. 378 U.S. at 517. 
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Ion 106 and Thornhill v. Alabama 107 in his discussion of how to ap­
proach overbroad legislation that curtails a personal first 
amendment right. Both Button and Thornhill indicated that when a 
statute sweeps too broadly, thereby infringing on first amendment 
rights in an attempt to regulate activities within the permissible 
scope of government regulation, that statute may be struck down as 
overbroad. lOS Thus in Aplheker, the irrebuttable presumption 109 cre­
ated by the statute that all members of an organization necessarily 
adhere to and advance the organization's philosophy, I 10 invalidated 
the statute. Justice Goldberg further indicated that if a member of a 
suspect organization applied for a passport to visit a sick relative 
abroad, he would be guilty of a crime based merely upon his mem­
bership in the suspect organization. II I InAplheker, it was within the 
scope of the fifth amendment due process clause for the Government 
to regulate travel abroad, but in finding that the facts in Aplheker 
106. 371 U.S. 415 (1963). BUllon involved a challenge by the NAACP to a Vir­
ginia statute which made it an offense for an organization such as the NAACP, its mem­
bers, and its staff lawyers to associate for the purpose of defending those persons who had 
claims relating to the infringement of their constitutional rights. Id. at 428. The Court 
applied the first amendmen! overbreadth doctrine in reversing the Virginia Supreme 
Court of Appeals' endorsement of the statute. The overbreadth doctrine was employed 
to point out that a statute, if not narrowly drawn, may infringe upon or deter the exercise 
of first amendment rights by those who are not the direct object of the regulation. Id. at 
433-34. 
107. 310 U.S. 88 (1940). Thornhill, convicted for violating an Alabama statute that 
made it a misdemeanor to loiter at a place of business without just cause, or to picket a 
place of business for the purpose of hindering, delaying or interfering with such business, 
challenged the statute on the ground that it deprived him of the "right of peaceful assem­
blage," "the right of freedom of speech," and "the right to petition for redress." Id. at 
91-93. 
The Court stated that the statute did not aim specifically at evils within an allowable 
area of state control, but swept within its ambit many activities which under ordinary 
circumstances would constitute an exercise of freedom of speech or the press. "The exist­
ence of such a statute, which readily lends itself to harsh and discriminatory enforcement 
by local prosecuting officials, against particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure, 
results in a continuous and pervasive restraint on all freedom of discussion that might 
reasonably be regarded as within its purview." Id. at 97-98. 
108. NAACP v. B4tton, 371 U.S. at 432-33; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. at 97. 
109. Section 6 of the Subversive Activities Control Act establishes an irrebuttable 
presumption that if members of a specified organization are given passports, they will 
necessarily engage in activity detrimental to the security of the United States. 378 U.S. at 
511. The statute in Aptheker could not be limited in a fashion similar to the statute in 
Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 221 (1961) in which the Court interpreted a statute 
imposing criminal penalties on organization members to apply only to "active members." 
378 U.S. at 511 n.9. The Aptheker Court indicated that neither the words nor the legisla­
tive history of section 6 allows such a construction. Id. 
110. See note 92 supra. 
111. 378 U.S. at 511. See note 98 supra. 
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created a situation in which the travel restriction infringed upon a 
first amendment right, the Court employed a first amendment, rather 
than a fifth amendment, standard to invalidate the statute. 
Justice Black concurred in the majority holding,ll2 but refused 
to recognize that the due process clause of the fifth amendment alone 
confers an unabridged constitutional right to trave1. l13 Rather, he 
would have invalidated section 6 on three grounds. "4 The third 
ground was that it denied freedom of speech, press, and association 
as guaranteed by the first amendment. I 15 
Justice Douglas, also concurring,"6 noted the importance of 
freedom of domestic and international movement to the individual's 
cultural, social, political, and economic activities. 117 He considered 
freedom of movement the essence of a free society; therefore, if one 
restricts travel, other first amendment rights may suffer. I IS 
C. Travel-Cutting Back on Constitutional Protection? 
Prior to Zemel v. Rusk, 119 the Cuban missile crisis necessitated 
that the Secretary declare invalid all outstanding passports for travel 
to Cuba; passports held by persons already in Cuba were excepted. 
Similar to the Court in Kent, the Zemel Court confronted a chal­
lenge to an action by the Secretary allegedly authorized by the 
broadly worded Passport Act. 120 The Court was faced with the ques­
tion of whether there was a sufficiently substantial and consistent 
administrative practice to warrant the conclusion that Congress had 
implicitly approved the invalidation. 121 In distinguishing Kent, the 
Court noted that in Kent, the Secretary refused to invalidate a pass­
112. 378 U.S. at 517 (Black, J., concurring). 
113. /d. at 518. 
114. The first ground was that the Act was a bill of attainder, and the second, that 
it violates the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendment procedural protections. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. at 519 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
117. /d. at 519-20. 
118. Id. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Clark argued that granting standing to 
attack the statute on its face was improper because the standing exception applies only to 
first amendment cases. Id. at 521-22 (Clark, J., dissenting). See note 166 infra. Obvi­
ously Justice Clark is of the opinion that a first amendment analysis is inapposite to 
questions concerning the right to travel abroad. He also felt that even if standing was 
properly granted, section 6 of the Act was valid on its face because the remedy adopted 
by Congress to control the spread of Communism and subversive ideas by restricting 
travel was reasonable in relation to the Government's objective. 378 U.S. at 527 (Clark, 
J., dissenting). 
119. 381 U.S. I (1965). 
120. See -note 39 supra. 
121. 381 U.S. at 12. 
467 1982] TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS 
port because of characteristics peculiar to the appellant, while in 
Zemel, the restriction was based on foreign policy considerations af­
fecting all citizens. 122 After a review of past administrative prac­
tice,123 the majority concluded that the Secretary had validly 
exercised his authority to restrict. travel to selected areas of the 
world. 124 
Having reached this conclusion, the Court was obliged to con­
sider the constitutionality of the Secretary's action. Chief Justice 
Warren, writing for the majority, acknowledged the position taken in 
Kent, reaffirmed in Aptheker, that the right to travel abroad deserves 
protection as a liberty interest under the fifth amendment due pro­
cess clause. 125 But he added a caveat indicating that there are cir­
cumstances wherein this liberty interest could be inhibited. 126 Chief 
Justice Warren weighed the government interests127 and concluded 
that where a travel restriction is "supported by the weightiest consid­
erations of national security,"128 the travel restriction does not vio­
late the fifth amendment. 129 
The Zemel Court also rejected appellant's argument that the re­
striction violated his first amendment rights to gather and dissemi­
nate information. Chief Justice Warren distinguished both Kent and 
Aptheker on the ground that the restrictions imposed on travel in 
those cases were based on an individual's association with the Com­
munist Party, 130 thus implying that the restriction on the right of as­
sociation deserves greater scrutiny than the speech restriction in 
Zemel. 131 While the Court recognized that restricting travel to Cuba 
122. Id. at 13. 
123. Id. at 7-12. 
124. Id. at 13. Zemel spawned a new generation of passport cases involving area 
restrictions. See Lynd v. Rusk, 389 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Porter v. Herter, 278 F.2d 
280 (D.C. Cir.), cerl. denied, 364 U.S. 837 (1960); Worthy v. Herter, 270 F.2d 905 (D.C. 
Cir.), cerl. denied, 361 U.S. 918 (1959); Frank v. Herter, 269 F.2d 245 (D.C. Cir. 1959). 
Area restrictions are implemented to achieve three objectives: "(1) to seal off an area 
because of peculiar, short term circumstances; (2) to promote national security; and (3) to 
facilitate foreign relations." Comment, Judicial Review ofIhe RighI 10 Travel, 42 WASH. 
L. REV. 873, 892 (1967). 
125. 381 U.S. at 14. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 14-15. These interests were: (I) that Cuba was the only Communist 
controlled territory in the Western Hemisphere; (2) that the goal of the Cuban govern­
ment is to export its Communist revolution to the rest of Latin America; (3) that the 
United States must act to protect the safety of its nationals traveling abroad. Id. 
128. Id. at 16. 
129. Id. at 15. 
130. Id. at 16. 
131. This may be an implicit recognition by.the Court that where a restriction on 
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limited appellant's access to information and his ability to dissemi­
nate that information upon his return to the United States, the re­
striction in Zemel was labeled an "inhibition of action" not 
protected by the first amendment as opposed to an inhibition of 
speech, which is protected by the first amendment. 132 Therefore, 
while the Court continued to recognize that a fifth amendment test 
must be applied in factual situations similar to Zemel, it refused to 
interpret the facts of the case to show an inhibition of rights falling 
within the first amendment. 133 
Chief Justice Warren concluded the discussion of the Secre­
tary's authority to impose restrictions on travel to certain parts ofthe 
world by citing United States v. Curtiss- Wright Export Corp. 134 for 
the proposition that there have been numerous occasions where 
Congress has chosen to allow the executive branch to exercise its 
unrestricted judgment, or has permitted the executive branch to op­
erate under standards that are more general than ordinarily re­
quired. 135 Chief Justice Warren reasoned that this is especially true 
in the area of foreign affairs where "Congress-in giving the Execu­
tive authority over matters of foreign affairs-must of necessity paint 
with a brush broader than it customarily wields in domestic ar­
eas."136 As the Passport Act does not grant to the executive unlim­
ited authority in the area of foreign affairs relative to passports, the 
Passport Act must take its content from the history of the adminis­
trative practice associated with passport denials and revocations. 137 
the right to travel inhibits a first amendment right, the Court may apply a stricter stan­
dard of review. 
132. 381 U.S. at 15. This dichotomy was the basis for rejecting the first amend­
ment challenge in Agee. 453 U.S. at 304-06. 
133. See notes 183-92 infra and accompanying text. One might suggest that both 
Zemel and Agee were highly result-oriented due to the sensitive nature of the national 
security issue involved, but the use of the conduct/speech dichotomy in Zemel, and in 
Agee, does not offer a satisfying rationale for dismissing the first amendment issue. Id. 
134. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
135. 381 U.S. at 17. 
136. Id. Contra, Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. at 129. Regulation of "liberty" under 
the fifth amendment must be pursuant to the law-making function of Congress, Youngs­
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-89 (1952), and when activities such 
as travel are involved, powers delegated by Congress to the Executive which curtail these 
activities will be construed narrowly. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 301-02 (1944). 
While Congress may ordinarily delegate power under broad standards, the delega­
tion must necessarily be narrow when fundamental rights are involved because deficien­
cies connected with legislative directives to executive officers are more serious when 
liberty and fundamental rights are at stake. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 274-75 
(1967) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
137. 381 U.S. at 17-18. 
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In Zemel, the Court found that past administrative practice was suf­
ficient to validate the action of the Secretary.138 
Justice Douglas, in his dissent,I39 stated that a government offi­
cial cannot approve and disapprove of one's travel simply because 
ideas please or offend the official or because some political objective 
is served by restricting movement. 140 He further stated that allowing 
Congress to paint with a "broad brush" ignores the principle 
adopted in NAACP v. Alabama,'41 that government regulation may 
not be achieved by unnecessarily broad means that invade the area 
of protected freedoms. 142 
The dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas in Zemel and the first 
amendment analysis used in Aptheker support the proposition that 
there are certain situations in which the right to travel is closely tied 
to the first amendment and, if restricted, may unconstitutionally in­
fringe upon rights acknowledged to fall within the protection of the 
first amendment. 143 
IV. THE NEED FOR A FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS 
Although Agee is not an exemplary member of our society, this 
factor should not necessitate the automatic dismissal of his constitu­
tional rights. Justice Brennan cautioned that "bad facts make bad 
law,"'44 and that any attempt to fashion a decision on "bad facts" 
always should take into consideration the potential ramifications of 
tailoring a decision only to those facts.145 In discussing the conflict 
between the Government's need to act decisively to safeguard the 
national security and the individual's rights that may be infringed 
upon by government action, the court of appeals indicated that when 
the Government attempts to prevent a danger to society by restrict­
ing individual rights, the security gained is illusory. This is because 
the security is purchased at the cost of the surrender of protections 
138. Id. at 18. 
139. Id. at 23 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
140. Id. at 26. 
141. 377 U.S. 288 (1964). 
142. 381 U.S. at 26. 
143. Justice Douglas also reaffirmed the position he had taken in Kent, that the 
right to converse with others, to observe social, physical, political, and other phenomena 
abroad is inextricably tied to freedom of movement. Thus, he argued that freedom of 
movement has "large social values." Id. at 24 (quoting Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. at 126 
(dicta». 
144. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 319 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
145. Id. See notes 18-34 supra and accompanying text. 
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afforded individual rights. 146 While national security is an indispen­
sible concern of the Government, individual liberties should not be 
lightly disregarded. '47 
The Supreme Court may have erred by not discussing fully the 
arguments that Agee's first amendment freedoms of speech and press 
were violated. '48 This is not to say that the outcome necessarily 
would have been different if a strict first amendment standard of re­
view had been applied: By avoiding the issue, however, the Court 
left the door open for arbitrary action by the Secretary under section 
51.70(b)(4). As a result ofAgee, the Secretary now has absolute dis­
cretion to determine when activities are "causing or are likely to 
cause serious damage to the national security or foreign policy of the 
United States."149 
Agee's first amendment argument was based in part on 
Aptheker, in which the Court invalidated an administrative regula­
tion that was overbroad on its face. 150 An overbroad regulation is 
one that could be employed by the Secretary not only at times when 
there is documented proof of damage, but in any instance that may 
fall within the Secretary's definition of danger to national security or 
foreign policy.l5l The Court responded to Agee's argument by rely­
ing on Califano v. Aznavorian, 152 in which it declared that the right to 
travel abroad should be judged by a "rational basis test" that re­
quires the regulation to be upheld so long as the travel restriction it 
creates is not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. 153 The Agee 
Court's reliance on Aznavorian for the proposition that all travel re­
striction cases are governed by the fifth amendment rather than the 
first amendment was misplaced. '54 Aznavorian involved the plight 
146. Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 P.2d 1192, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 
Kissinger v. Halperin, 446 U.S. 951 (1980), ajf'd in part, cert. denied in part, 452 U.S. 713 
(1981). 
147. This is not to say that there are only a few situations where national security 
interests should be paramount to individual rights. This statement is merely in response 
to the Court's extreme view implicit in Agee that national security interests will always 
outweigh individual rights. 
148. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1,23 (1965) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Aptheker 
v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) (dicta). 
149. 22 C.P.R. § 51.70(b)(4). See note 40 supra. The effects of this regulation are 
not limited to activities that might harm national security, but also include the broader 
area of foreign policy. See note 63 supra and accompanying text. 
150. Brief for Respondent at 103, Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) [hereinafter 
cited as Brief for Respondent). 
151. See text accompanying notes 158-81 infra. 
152. 439 U.S. 170 (1978). 
153. Id. at 174. 
154. The Aznavorian Court distinguished Kent, Zemel, and Aptheker: "The statu­
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of a welfare recipient who was denied her statutory benefits because 
she had traveled to Mexico and, due to an illness, remained there for 
a period longer than allowed by the statute. 155 In A znavorian, there 
was no indication that the statutory limitation on international travel 
infringed on a right protected by the first amendment. 156 In Agee, 
however, the fact that Agee's writing was curtailed raised a first 
amendment issue. 
The Court successfully avoided a first amendment analysis in 
Agee by assuming that the rationale in Aznavorian was applicable 
simply because both cases involved international travel. But the 
facts in Aznavorian are inapposite to the facts in Agee .157 Thus, by 
avoiding a first amendment analysis in Agee, the Court did not have 
to demonstrate why the Secretary's· regulation was not overbroad on 
its face. As a result, a potentially overbroad regulation was allowed 
to stand. 
A. Overbreadth Analysis 
Overbreadth analysis attempts to remedy a situation wherein a 
statute, regulation, or ordinance on its face sweeps beyond the con­
duct that it may properly regulate and begins to infringe upon rights 
protected by the Constitution. ISS It is important to note that in over­
breadth analysis the constitutional rights of the person challenging 
the statute need not have been violated. 159 In Thornhill v. Ala­
bama,160 relied on in Aptheker to invalidate section 6 of the Subver­
sive Activities Control Act,161 the Court said that a statute 
prohibiting all peaceful picketing "does not aim specifically at evils 
tory provision in issue here does not have nearly so direct an impact on the freedom to 
travel internationally as occurred in the Kent, Aptheker or Zemel cases.... It does not 
limit the right to travel on grounds that may be in tension with the First Amendment." 
Id. at 177. 
155. Id. at 171-72. 
156. Indeed, the Aznavorian Court implied that the statute in question had only an 
incidental effect on international travel for "[i)t does not limit the availability or validity 
of passports." Id. at 177; Note, Califano v. Aznavorian: Social Security Residence Re­
qUirement f)oes Not Impair Right ofInternational Travel, 6 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 
101, 107 (1980). The statute in Aznavorian was designed to insure that an individual's 
residence in the United States is genuine by denying welfare benefits to individuals who 
have been out of the country for more than thirty consecutive days. 439 U.S. at 178. On 
the other hand, the regulation in Agee was specifically designed to restrict travel with the 
potential concomitant effect of infringing on other rights inextricably tied to travel. 
157. See text accompanying notes 155-56 supra and notes 18-48 supra. 
158. L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 710-12. 
159. See note 166 infta and accompanying text. 
160. 310 U.S. 88 (1940). 
161. 378 U.S. at 516 (citingThornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940». 
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within the allowable area of State control but, on the contrary, 
sweeps within its ambit other activities that in ordinary circum­
stances constitute an exercise of speech or the press."162 
Agee attacked the Secretary's regulation on overbreadth 
grounds. 163 He argued that his right to speak and publish was in­
fringed upon by the application of a regulation aimed at controlling 
his conduct abroad. Agee alleged that passport revocation was only 
a vehicle to reach the actual target, his media activity exposing CIA 
operatives, and that revocation was intended to deter him from at­
tacking the policies of the Government and the CIA. He argued that 
the regulation, drafted to curtail travel conduct, was so broad that it 
could be used to infringe upon first amendment rights of others. 
Agee further alleged that the regulation infringed upon his own first 
amendment rights. 164 
Factually, the situation in Agee is analogous to Aptheker be­
cause in Aptheker the travel restriction also was employed as a 
means to prevent certain individuals from exercising their rights of 
association. 165 The restriction in Aptheker was overbroad because it 
could have been used to deny passports to those whose travel abroad 
was not a threat to the nation. The same is true of the regulation in 
Agee. In addition, Aptheker also stands for the proposition that 
Agee has standing to challenge the validity of the Secretary's regula­
tion on overbreadth grounds. 166 Therefore, the issue the Court 
should have reached in Agee was whether Agee's allegation of over­
breadth could be asserted validly in light of recent first amendment 
162. 310 u.s. at 97. 
163. 453 U.S. at 287. 
164. Id. at 306. 
165. See text accompanying notes 91-111 supra. 
166. A unique feature of Aptheker relates to the problem of standing to raise a 
constitutional challenge to the facial validity of the Subversive Activities Control Act. 
Generally, in non-first amendment cases, a person cannot claim standing in a federal 
court to adjudicate the constitutional rights of a third party. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 
U.S. 249, 255 (1953). In most instances, the court will not allow one to attack a statute 
which is constitutional when applied to the challenger on the ground that its application 
might be unconstitutional against another person or in another situation. United States 
v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17,21 (1960). See also Yazoo & Miss. R.R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 
226 U.S. 217, 219-20 (1912). First amendment challenges appear tobe the exception to 
this rule. Comment, supra note 124, at 879. 
The rationale behind this exception for the first amendment cases is that the over­
broad statute, while properly restricting the individual before the Court, might also apply 
to others not before the Court who are engaging in protected activity that the law appears 
to outlaw. J. NOWAK, supra note 3, at 722. See Note, Standing to Assert Constitutional 
Jus Tertii, 88 HARV. L. REV. 423, 424 (1974). 
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cases limiting the application of the overbreadth doctrine. 167 
In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 168 a revised view of the overbreadth 
doctrine was expressly adopted by the Court. 169 Justice White ana­
lyzed a constitutional attack on an Oklahoma statute prohibiting all 
civil service employees from engaging in any form of political activ­
ity except for those activities involving the right to express privately 
an opinion and to cast a vote. 170 The Court, in recognizing that the 
overbreadth doctrine is an exception to traditional rules of prac­
tice,171 formulated a new, stricter standard. The Court determined 
that in situations wherein both conduct and speech are involved, the 
overbreadth of the statute must be both real and substantial in rela­
tion to the legitimate sweep of the statute. 172 Broadrick restricted the 
overbreadth doctrine, and thus eased the burden on the Govern­
ment, which, under traditional overbreadth analysis had the heavy 
burden to show that the statute did not infringe upon a protected 
first amendment right. 173 
In light ofBroadrick, the question in Agee becomes whether the 
overbreadth of the Secretary's regulation 174 is real and substantial in 
relation to the Secretary's legitimate authority to regulate travel 
within the bounds of due process. Agee submitted an affidavit to the 
court of appeals in which he indicated that if he could not speak or 
167. One could argue that the Supreme Court's refusal to raise the overbreadth 
issue in Agee, even though it was discussed at length in both parties' briefs, may have 
been in effect a sub silentio disaffirmance of the doctrine. It is also puzzling that Agee's 
attorneys made no mention of the cases which revised the overbreadth doctrine for 
clearly this is an obstacle which must be overcome before the analysis will apply. 
168. 413 U.S. 601 (1973). 
169. Id. at 615. The revised view of the overbreadth doctrine first appeared several 
years earlier in the dissenting opinion to Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 617­
21 (1971) (White, J., dissenting). 
170. 413 U.S. at 602-07 & 603 n.!. 

17!. Id. at 615. 

172. Id. 
173. See L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 710-12. More recently, the Court in Arnett v. 
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), held that a federal statute authorizing the removal or 
suspension without pay of tenured government employees "for such cause as will pro­
mote the efficiency of the service" was not overbroad. Id. at 162. 
Justice Marshall, dissenting, noted that the uncertainty of the scope of the statute 
would have a "chilling effect." Id. at 230. Employees would limit their behavior to that 
which is unquestionably safe, for "the threat of dismissal from public employment is. . . 
a potent means of inhibiting speech .... The dismissal standard hangs over their heads 
like a sword of Damocles, threatening them with dismissal for any speech that might 
impair the 'efficiency of service.' " Id. at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
-174. 22 C.F.R. § 5!.70(b)(4) (1981). See note 30 supra. 
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write about the CIA he could not work. 175 Therefore, as a result of 
the restriction on his ability to travel, Agee believed that his ability 
to exercise his profession had been severely curtailed. The abuse 
that Agee claimed he suffered resulted from the application of sec­
tion 51.70(b)(4), which permits passport revocation if the Secretary 
determines that the individual is "likely to cause serious damage to 
the national security or foreign policy of the United States."176 
The judgment the Secretary will exercise in determining 
whether a traveler has damaged foreign policy or national security 
may often be based on political opinion or commitment to a rigid 
viewpoint, as opposed to an objective evaluation of the traveler's ac­
tivities and their effect on foreign policy or national security.177 
Thus, under the present regulation, the passports of American jour­
nalists attempting to gather information about the Bay of Pigs inci­
dent or the Vietnam War justifiably could have been revoked. 178 In 
addition, the regulation could prevent other critics of national for­
eign policy from traveling abroad to influence international opinion 
on a number of policy questions. This is the kind of information 
that should reach the ears of the national populace in order to allow 
it to intelligently undertake the responsibilities of citizenship. 179 
Broadrick clearly set out heightened requirements for over­
breadth analysis where both conduct and speech are involved, thus it 
is arguable whether the Court would have invalidated the Secretary's 
regulation following Broadrick's overbreadth analysis} 80 The 
Court's sub rosa treatment of this important issue, however, may 
have a chilling effect on those who wish to exercise their right to 
criticize the government while traveling outside the political bounda­
ries of the United States. 181 
175. Joint Appendix for Writ of Certiorari at 32-34, Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 
(1981). 
176. See note 72 supra. 
177. Brief for Respondent at 106, supra note 150. 
178. The Secretary of State made a judgment as to whether journalists' reporting 
on the Bay of Pigs and the Vietnam War would endanger national security, and as his­
tory shows, the Secretary did not prohibit reporting. /d. at 107-08. On the other hand, 
the Secretary did believe that it was necessary to prevent Louis Zemel from traveling to 
Cuba following the missile crisis. 381 U.S. at 14-16. In each instance, posterity will 
determine whether the Secretary appropriately exercised his judgment. 
179. Brief for Respondent at 106, supra note 150. 
180. See text accompanying notes 168-76 supra. 
181. While it is true that Agee's action appears to be far more damaging to the 
national security of the United States than mere criticism could be, there is no reason 
why the Court could not have either engaged in an overbreadth analysis or limited the 
holding to the specific facts of the case. By doing neither, those travelers who merely 
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B. The Conduct-Speech Dichotomy 
The Court employed the dichotomy between conduct and 
speech182 in an attempt to show that only Agee's travel conduct was 
inhibited by the revocation of his passport. By introducing this di­
chotomy into their analysis, the Court was able to avoid raising the 
issues of first amendment violation. The question is whether this di­
chotomy is a valid analytical tool, or merely a vehicle to enable the 
Court to reach a desired result. 
The conduct-speech dichotomy has had an inconsistent devel­
opment in first amendment analysis. The Court first applied this dis­
tinction with divergent results in the labor picketing cases. 183 
Professor Tribe l84 argues that this dichotomy has no real content, for 
all communication involves conduct to some degree. 18S The means 
or medium of expression, the conduct aspect, is inextricably tied to 
the ability of one to communicate. 186 As a majority of cases in this 
area involve a mixed conduct-speech situation, the Court has been 
reluctant to set out a firm basis for severing the component parts. 187 
criticize the government are just as susceptible to action by the Secretary under 22 C.F.R. 
§ 51.70(b)(4) as those whose activities are as extreme as Agee's. In effect, Justice Mar­
shall's "sword of Damocles," Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134,231 (1974) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting), is hanging over the heads of all Americans who travel abroad. 
182. See notes 132-33 supra and accompanying text. 
183. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (declaring that peaceful picket­
ing was constitutionally protected free speech). COn/ra, Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, 
Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957) (banning peaceful picketing directed at establishing a "union 
shop"). 
184. Lawrence Tribe is a Professor of Law at Harvard University. 
185. L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 599. 
186. Id. 
187. The Court has set no standard for situations in which there is a mixed con­
duct-speech situation except that one must look to the nature of the conduct involved and 
to the factual context and environment in which it was undertaken. Spence v. Washing­
ton, 418 U.S. 405, 409-10 (1974). 
In Spence, the Court found that a large peace symbol fashioned from removable 
tape and temporarily affixed to an American flag was a form of speech protected under 
the first amendment and not conduct. Id. at 415. But in United States v. O'Brien, 391 
U.S. 367 (1968), the Court held that the burning of a draft card was not protected "sym­
bolic speech" but rather conduct which could be regulated. Id. at 382. Apparently the 
motives of both Spence and O'Brien were to protest against government policies both at 
home and abroad. 
Finally, in a situation theoretically analogous to Agee, the Court struck down on 
first amendment grounds a statute which penalized individuals who expressed their op­
position to organized government by displaying "a red flag,. . . as an invitation or stim­
ulus to anarchistic action." Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 361 (1931). The statute 
discussed in Stromberg was aimed at suppressing communication and "could not be sus­
tained as a regulation of non communicative conduct." 391 U.S. at 382. One could argue 
that the regulation in Agee, while not aimed at communication, does in fact restrict com­
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This has led Professor Tribe to the conclusion that the conduct­
speech dichotomy is not a valid analytical tool for the Court to em­
ploy in a situation wherein a restriction on conduct also infringes 
upon protected first amendment rights. 188 
Use of this result oriented analysis enabled the Agee majority to 
declare that Agee's travel was merely conduct and, therefore, was 
subject to regulation within the bounds of fifth amendment due pro­
cess. Having made the decision to sever Agee's travel conduct from 
his speech, the Court then properly argued that only a fifth amend­
ment "reasonableness" test need be applied. But the Court's conces­
sion that "the revocation of Agee's passport rests in part on the 
content of his speech"189 undercuts this position. This statement 
does not support the argument that conduct and speech can be 
cleanly separated; the statement clearly implies that they overlap. 
Recognition that the content of Agee's speech was partially involved 
in the decision to revoke his passport should automatically have trig­
gered a first amendment analysis. 
!fit were solely Agee's travel that the Secretary sought to enjoin, 
the fifth amendment standard would have been proper. But the 
Court implied that restricting Agee's travel was only a means em­
ployed to stifle his speech. It is unlikely that Agee's freedom of 
movement would have been restricted if he had been traveling 
throughout Europe extolling the virtues of the CIA. Therefore, one 
may draw the conclusion that had it not been for Agee's outspoken 
hostility toward the CIA and the Government, the Secretary would 
not have had grounds to revoke Agee's passport. Agee did not seek 
munication, and therefore should not be sustained as a regulation of noncommunicative 
conduct. 
188. L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 600. The Court employed this dichotomy in Cox v. 
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (Cox II) and in Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 
(1963). Both cases involved mass protests by black students in a public place. In each 
case there was a large crowd of white onlookers together with a sizable police contingent. 
After a lengthy period of surveillance, the police in both cases disbanded the crowds. 
While there are significant differences in terms of time and place, the style of the expres­
sion was similar; they were ceremonials of protest, not riots. Kelven, The Concept 0/the 
Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1,4-6. 
Noting the similarities in the facts, the Court characterized the Edwards protest as a 
pure exercise of first amendment rights, 372 U.S. at 235-36, while the Cox Court found 
that the protest was akin to "mob rule." 379 U.S. at 562. Finding the characterization of 
the two courses of conduct to be "strikingly inconsistent," Tribe notes that the distinction 
between speech and conduct at best announces a conclusion rather than the analytic 
process the Court employed to reach that conclusion. L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 600. 
189. 453 U.S. at 308. See text accompanying notes 59-66 supra. 
1982] TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS 477 
to escape the law or to violate it. 190 Nor is there a law that specifi­
cally curtails the activity engaged in by Agee. 191 There is only a 
vague regulation enforceable by the Secretary at his discretion. 
This is not to say that Agee's speech is absolutely protected by 
the first amendment, for the Government's interest in protecting na­
tional security undoubtedly would weigh heavily against Agee even 
under a first amendment analysis. On the other hand, the implica­
tions of avoiding a plenary discussion of the first amendment ques­
tion are far-reaching. The Court has set no standard to limit the 
sweep of the Secretary's authority under section S1.70(b)(4). The 
potential for abuse thus is present 192 as a consequence of tailoring a 
decision to fit the difficult facts presented. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Many Americans have strong beliefs about the role of CIA op­
erations at home and abroad. Some may think that Agee's form of 
housecleaning is necessary to maintain the integrity and credibility 
of the United States in the international arena, while many others 
believe that Agee and other former CIA agents who have followed a 
similar path are not loyal American citizens. While avoiding any 
value judgment, this note has attempted to demonstrate that it is vi­
tally important from a legal standpoint to discuss fully the doctrines 
that any factual situation brings into issue. 
In Haig v. Agee,193 facts indicated that the revocation of Agee's 
passport pursuant to a regulation promulgated by the Secretary may 
have been merely a means to stifle his communicative behavior. If 
this is so, Agee should have been decided on first amendment 
grounds because there is authority indicating that the constitutional 
analysis to be afforded an individual whose first amendment rights 
have been violated must be more exacting than the analysis em­
ployed when only travel is involved. 
The Court avoided the first amendment question by returning 
190. In fact the Justice Department determined that there were insufficient grounds 
for prosecution. See note 21 supra. 
191. On June 23, 1982, Congress enacted, and President Reagan signed, see II 
WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 829 (June 28, 1982), the Intelligence Identities Protection 
Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-200, 1982 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS (96 Stat.) 122 (to 
be codified at 50 U.S.c. §§ 421-426). This law imposes criminal penalties on any person 
having authorized access to classified information, who intentionally discloses such infor­
mation to non-authorized persons, or who learns the identity of a covert agent and inten­
tionally discloses any information identifying such covert agent. Id. 
192. See notes 176-78 supra and accompanying text. 
193. 453 U.S. 280 (1981). 
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to a dichotomy between speech and conduct and, in doing so, con­
cluded that the restriction imposed on Agee affected only his con­
duct. Therefore, no first amendment right was violated. The Court 
has impliedly given the Secretary an unlimited grant of authority 
under his regulation. The Secretary now may rely on Agee as a sig­
nal from the Court that it will not interfere in a substantial way 
when the Secretary chooses to exercise his discretionary authority in 
the area of international travel. Undoubtedly, this at least will di­
minish some speech by Americans traveling abroad because the 
threat of passport revocation will be present. A full discussion of the 
first amendment issue might not have altered the result in Agee, but 
it would have provided a safeguard for the American traveler in the 
event the Secretary abused his authority to regulate international 
travel by American citizens. Agee provides no safeguards against 
such potential abuse. 
Scott A. Lessne 
